An example report on a real UK business
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Value my own businessValuation: HOLIDAY TAXIS GROUP LIMITED
Indicative valuation
The filed accounts do not contain enough profit and loss detail to estimate EBITDA.
Investor Note: Holiday Taxis Group Limited
1. Headline valuation
£98m to £141m
Based on EBITDA of £14.1m (FY2024 filed) at 7.0x to 10.0x
High confidence given full filed accounts and audited figures; the biggest variable is whether the business can sustain 68% EBITDA margins post-IPO restructuring, and acquirer appetite for a subsidiary carve-out from a listed parent.
2. Company snapshot
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Registered name | Holiday Taxis Group Limited |
| Company number | 04391036 |
| Incorporated | 2002 (11 March 2002) |
| Registered office | 7th Floor Tower 42, 25 Old Broad Street, London EC2N 1HN |
| Principal owner | Trina Group Limited (75–100% control) |
| Directors | Rebecca Marie Brett, Abigail Jane Dunning, Raul Pascual-Luzon |
| SIC / activity | 79909 – Other reservation service and related activities |
| Accounts made up to | 30 September 2024 |
Source: Companies House profile, PSC register, officers list, filing history.
3. Business description
Holiday Taxis Group operates an online marketplace connecting travellers with ground transportation providers at airports, ports and train stations worldwide. Revenue is generated primarily through booking commissions on airport transfers across more than 21,000 destinations in 150+ countries, served via a consumer website and a B2B travel agent channel. The model is highly transactional with revenue tied to individual bookings rather than long-term contracts, though repeat direct traffic and agent relationships provide partial recurrence.
Sources: website text, filed accounts notes.
4. The industry
The global airport transfer and ground transportation booking sector sits within the broader online travel agency market, which is estimated at approximately £15–20bn in the UK alone for all OTA services (estimate). The specialist airport transfer segment is smaller, perhaps £400–600m in UK-originated bookings (estimate), but growing at roughly 5–8% CAGR as leisure travel continues to recover post-pandemic and travellers increasingly pre-book transfers rather than relying on taxi ranks.
Demand is driven by rising outbound travel volumes, consumer preference for hassle-free arrivals, and the expansion of low-cost airlines to secondary airports where public transport is limited. The market is moderately fragmented: a handful of global platforms, such as GetTransfer, Hoppa and Welcome Pickups, compete alongside white-label solutions embedded in airline and hotel booking flows. Consolidation is underway: major OTA groups have been acquiring niche transfer businesses to capture ancillary revenue, as evidenced by HBX Group's IPO in early 2025 and its rollup of brands including this entity.
Over the next three to five years, growth should remain positive, underpinned by travel normalisation and B2B partnerships with airlines and tour operators. The primary structural risk is margin compression as aggregators and ride-hailing giants (Uber, Bolt) push into the pre-booked airport segment. For a seller today, acquirer interest is strong given proven profitability and platform economics; however, the window could narrow if ride-hail players intensify competition.
5. Top competitors
- GetTransfer – global marketplace model, similar commission structure, strong in Europe and APAC (larger by booking volume, inferred)
- Welcome Pickups – licensed transfer service with tour add-ons, backed by VC, focused on Southern Europe (similar scale, inferred)
- Hoppa – UK-based airport transfer aggregator, legacy brand, now part of the Rentalcars/Booking Holdings ecosystem (larger parent group)
- Jayride – Australian-listed airport transfer marketplace expanding internationally (similar niche, smaller UK footprint)
- Blacklane – premium chauffeur-driven segment, targeting corporate travel (higher price point, partial overlap)
These competitors are inferred from market knowledge; no explicit competitor list was found in filed documents.
6. Reconstructed profit and loss
Most recent filed accounts: FY2024, made up to 30 September 2024. Today's date is 13 August 2026, so the data is approximately 23 months old. Given this staleness, an FY2026 estimate is rolled forward below.
Reconstructed profit and loss, GBP, figures marked (est.) are derived
- EBITDA
- Additional gross profit
- Cost of sales to total revenue
Basis: FY2024 and FY2023 figures are taken directly from full audited accounts (PwC). EBITDA is calculated as operating profit plus depreciation & amortisation (£13.4m + £0.7m = £14.1m for FY2024; £12.5m + £0.5m = £13.0m for FY2023). Revenue grew 6.5% YoY in FY2024. FY2026 roll-forward assumes continuation of 3–8% growth (owner-confirmed) at 4.5% pa compounded over two years and stable operating margin. The business benefits from negligible cost of sales (supplier costs netted), so gross profit approximates revenue. Figures from full statutory accounts filed August 2025.
7. Reconstructed balance sheet
| Line | FY2024 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|
| Fixed assets | £1.2m | £0.9m |
| Stock | n/d | n/d |
| Debtors | £10.1m (est.) | £6.9m (est.) |
| Cash | £17.6m | £32.5m |
| Creditors due within one year | £21.4m | £19.8m |
| Creditors due after one year | £0.4m | £0.03m |
| Net current assets | £6.2m | £19.6m |
| Net assets | £37.9m | £23.8m |
Buyer notes: Cash of £17.6m at FY2024 year-end is substantial but the company is part of a group cash-pooling arrangement, with £30.9m owed by group undertakings (non-current, 4% interest, due 2026). On a standalone basis, much of that cash may not transfer to an acquirer; the equity-to-EV bridge will depend on how inter-company balances settle. Working capital is relatively light: creditors exceed debtors, meaning the business collects payment before paying suppliers, a favourable float. A £0.4m provision for litigation exists. No external debt or pension deficit is disclosed; no hire purchase or property held in the company. Normalised working capital appears negative, so a buyer would expect to inject less capital at completion.
Sources: full filed accounts FY2024, notes on inter-company balances. Debtors estimated as current assets less cash.
8. Valuation and workings
Sector multiples: Online travel and marketplace businesses of this scale and margin typically trade at 7x to 12x EBITDA. The higher end is reserved for platforms with strong recurring revenue, network effects and double-digit growth. Holiday Taxis' 68% EBITDA margin is exceptional, but revenue quality is moderate (transactional, not subscription) and near-term growth is in the single digits (owner-confirmed at 3–8%).
Precedent transaction: In February 2020, Booking Holdings acquired Farelogix (travel tech) for an undisclosed sum, but more relevant is the HBX Group IPO in February 2025, which valued the parent group at a reported enterprise multiple of approximately 10–12x EBITDA (source: Financial Times, HBX Group IPO coverage, February 2025). As a subsidiary within that group, Holiday Taxis would likely attract a discount on carve-out complexity but a premium for standalone profitability.
Multiple range applied: 7.0x to 10.0x, reflecting owner-confirmed 3–8% growth, moderate revenue recurrence (~30%), strong 15%+ margin (filed margins are far higher, but buyer may normalise for group allocations), and low capex intensity (~5%). The upper end assumes a strategic acquirer paying for synergies; the lower end assumes a financial buyer normalising margins and applying a control discount.
Indicative EV range: £14.1m EBITDA × 7.0x = £98.7m; £14.1m × 10.0x = £141m. Rounded: £98m to £141m.
Note: Valuation is based on FY2024 EBITDA (23 months old). If FY2026 EBITDA has indeed grown to £15.4m as estimated, the range would shift upward to £108m–£154m.
9. What buyers call exceptional
These bars are calibrated for UK SMEs and do not apply to midcap or larger businesses, where the thresholds are very different.
| Metric | Good | Exceptional | This business | Read |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Industry growth | 5%+ CAGR | 10%+ CAGR | 3–8% (owner-confirmed) | Good |
| Revenue scale | £10m+ | £20m+ | £20.7m | Exceptional |
| Revenue growth | 8%+ YoY | 15%+ YoY | 6.5% | Below |
| EBITDA margin | 17.5%+ | 22.5%+ | 68% (filed) | Exceptional |
| Gross margin | 50%+ | 75%+ | 98% | Exceptional |
| Customer concentration (top 5) | <15% | <10% | Not disclosed | Unknown |
The metric that most limits the multiple today is revenue growth: at 6.5% YoY it falls short of the 8%+ threshold that drives premium valuations in digital marketplaces.
10. Preparing for exit
| When | Action | Why a buyer cares | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0–3 months | Obtain confirmation of inter-company balance treatment on any carve-out | Buyer needs to know how much of the £17.6m cash actually transfers and whether the £30.9m receivable from group will be settled | EBITDA (↑) |
| 0–3 months | Prepare standalone management accounts excluding group cost allocations | Filed accounts sit within HBX group; buyers need to see normalised standalone overheads to model true margins | Multiple (↑) |
| 3–9 months | Secure multi-year B2B contracts with key travel agent partners (currently project-based) | Recurring contracted revenue improves revenue quality score from ~30% toward 60%+ | Multiple (↑) |
| 3–9 months | Document IP ownership and licensing for booking platform technology | Any ambiguity on software or data assets would stall DD, especially if technology was developed at group level | Multiple (↑) |
| 9–12+ months | Grow direct consumer traffic as a share of total bookings to reduce OTA/agent dependency | Higher direct mix means better unit economics and less exposure to partner pricing pressure | EBITDA (↑) |
| 9–12+ months | Build out a standalone executive team (CEO, CFO) to reduce perceived key-person risk from group leadership | Buyer will want management continuity; current directors are group appointments | Multiple (↑) |
Highest-return action: Resolving the inter-company balance treatment is the single most important step, as it directly determines net cash at completion and therefore equity value to the seller.
11. Choosing your sale route
| Route | Fit | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Trade sale to a competitor, customer or supplier | Strong fit | £20m+ revenue, 68% EBITDA margin and global supplier network make this highly attractive to larger OTAs or travel groups seeking to capture ancillary revenue; synergies on technology and supplier overlap justify a premium |
| Private equity | Possible | Platform economics and growth potential appeal to PE, but sub-10% growth and subsidiary status complicate a standalone buyout; more likely as part of a larger carve-out from HBX Group |
| Individual operator | Unlikely | Scale (£14m+ EBITDA) and complexity exceed what a single buyer could fund or manage; this is not a lifestyle business |
| Employee Ownership Trust | Unlikely | The business is a wholly owned subsidiary of a listed group; an EOT would require a full separation unlikely to be prioritised over a trade or PE exit |
Top-ranked route: trade sale. The most likely acquirers are global online travel groups, airline ancillary revenue teams or ground transportation platforms seeking to expand geographic coverage. Pursuing this route would likely mean a competitive process targeting two to four strategic bidders, potentially achieving the upper end of the multiple range. For the seller, this offers the fastest route to realisation, the highest likely price (given synergy value) and clean separation from the parent group, though the brand may be absorbed and key staff may not be retained beyond a short earnout or transition period.
What the process looks like
At your size expect a structured, competitive auction run by a larger corporate finance house, with full workstream due diligence and international buyers likely on the list. Allow around nine to fifteen months from starting properly to money in the bank.
| Phase | What happens | Typical duration |
|---|---|---|
| Preparation | Full vendor due diligence across financial, legal, tax and commercial, audited accounts, a management team ready to present, a professionally built data room | 3 to 4 months |
| Marketing | Controlled release of a teaser to a wide domestic and international buyer list, NDAs, information memorandum, process letter setting the timetable | 1 to 2 months |
| Offers and selection | Round one indicative offers, management presentations, site visits, round two binding offers, exclusivity granted late and briefly | 2 to 3 months |
| Due diligence | Financial, legal, tax, commercial, IT, insurance, environmental, ESG and pensions workstreams run simultaneously against a fixed timetable | 2 to 3 months |
| Legals | Share purchase agreement, disclosure, warranty and indemnity insurance, equity rollover and reinvestment documents, management incentive plan | 1 to 2 months |
| Completion and beyond | Signing, any regulatory or antitrust clearance, completion, then a defined transition period | Ongoing |
At this size, process discipline is the value driver. A well run timetable with several credible bidders reaching binding offers on the same day is what produces a premium.
What this is built from
- Companies House filings for 04391036.
- The company's public website (holidaytaxis.com), read for what the business actually does and who it sells to.
- Your own ratings on growth, stability, margin and capex, plus sector exit multiples for comparable UK businesses.
Next step
Exit your business to 1868 Capital
1868 Capital, led by Alec Dent, is actively looking to buy and run one strong UK business for the long term. If the profile fits, we can move quickly.
Why Alec started 1868 Capital
LinkedIn postAlec wrote this on why he is looking to buy and run one UK business for the long term.
Read on LinkedInWho is Alec?
Alec Dent leads 1868 Capital, which powers this Exit Estimator. He is looking to buy and personally run one high-quality UK business for the long term.
Before this he co-founded Weezy, grew it to hundreds of staff, sold it to Getir and ran global strategy there. You would be selling your business to an operator who has built, scaled and sold a company.
Is 1868 Capital the right fit?
I meet almost any owner thinking about exit, but this is the formal mandate:
- ✓Revenue of £5m to £60m, ideally with a recurring component and a stable track record
- ✓EBITDA of £1m to £10m with margins of 15% or more
- ✓Consistent growth of 10%+ a year over multiple years
- ✓A strong team in place, allowing a smooth leadership transition
- ✓England, Wales or Scotland, ideally near a major transport hub
- ✓Service-based model in a fragmented sector, mission critical to commercial clients
Other ways to sell
If the mandate does not fit, you may still have strong options:
Trade sale
A competitor or customer buys you. Often the highest headline price, but your business is absorbed and your legacy fades.
Private equity
Financial buyers back the team, then look to sell again in 3 to 5 years on fairly rigid market terms.
Employee Ownership Trust
Sell to your employees, usually with tax advantages and maximum continuity, though at a measured pace.