An example report on a real UK business
SHARPE & SONS (NOTTINGHAM) LIMITED is shown so you can see the full output. Run the same report on your own company in under two minutes.
Value my own businessValuation: SHARPE & SONS (NOTTINGHAM) LIMITED
Indicative valuation
The filed accounts do not contain enough profit and loss detail to estimate EBITDA.
Company snapshot
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Registered name | Sharpe & Sons (Nottingham) Limited |
| Company number | 05057320 |
| Incorporated | 2004 (26 February 2004) |
| Registered office | 6 Coachgap Lane, Langar, Nottingham NG13 9HP |
| Principal owner | Simon Christopher Sharpe (25–50%), Neil Stuart Sharpe (25–50%), Russell Mark Sharpe (25–50%) |
| Directors | James Peter Sharpe, Neil Stuart Sharpe, Russell Mark Sharpe, Simon Christopher Sharpe, Trevor Leonard Sharpe |
| SIC / activity | 49390 – Other passenger land transport n.e.c. |
| Accounts made up to | 28 February 2025 |
Business description
Sharpes of Nottingham operates a mixed fleet of executive coaches, double-decker buses and heritage vehicles from its depot near Nottingham, serving private hire, school contracts, scheduled day trips and corporate hospitality across the East Midlands and further afield. Revenue comes from a blend of contract work (school runs, scheduled routes) providing a recurring base and ad hoc private hire, which is more seasonal. The business has been family-run for over 20 years, with five PSCs all bearing the Sharpe name, indicating concentrated family ownership.
The industry
The UK coach and private bus hire market sits within the broader passenger land transport sector, estimated at roughly £7–8 billion annually. Growth has been modest, in the region of 3–5% per year since the post-pandemic recovery, driven by rising school transport demand (local authority outsourcing), corporate events and tourism. The sector is highly fragmented: the Office of Rail and Road counts over 4,000 licensed operators, though the top 10 (National Express, Arriva, Go-Ahead, Stagecoach, etc.) handle the bulk of scheduled services. Smaller regional operators like Sharpes compete on quality, relationships and flexibility rather than scale.
Consolidation is accelerating. Private equity has been active, with platforms such as TLC Travel Group acquiring independents to build regional density. However, the industry faces headwinds: driver shortages, rising fuel and insurance costs, and the capital cost of transitioning to Euro VI and eventually zero-emission fleets. Operators without the balance sheet to fund fleet renewal may find the next five years challenging.
For a seller today, the window is open but narrowing. Acquirers are looking for operators with well-maintained, compliant fleets and contract revenue. Businesses dependent on aging diesel stock or purely ad hoc hire will be harder to sell.
Top competitors
- Trent Barton – regional bus and coach operator with overlapping East Midlands routes
- Skills Coaches (Nottingham) – direct local competitor in private and school hire
- Centrebus – growing regional player acquiring smaller fleets
- Premiere Travel – East Midlands coach operator serving similar corporate and private hire
- Notts & Derby (trentbarton group) – scheduled services and school contracts in the same catchment
(Inferred from sector knowledge and geography; no direct competitive disclosure in sources.)
Reconstructed profit and loss
Most recent filed accounts: FY2025, made up to 28 February 2025.
Reconstructed profit and loss, GBP, figures marked (est.) are derived
- EBITDA
- Additional gross profit
- Cost of sales to total revenue
Basis: Accounts are unaudited abridged, so no P&L is filed. Revenue and EBITDA are our estimates based on net asset growth (£1.54m to £1.90m in the latest year, implying c.£355k post-tax profit), depreciation of £442k, deferred tax movement of c.£82k, and sector-typical EBITDA margins of 13–15% for regional coach operators. Headcount is taken directly from the notes to the filed accounts.
Reconstructed balance sheet
| Line | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fixed assets | £3,555,276 | £3,182,164 | n/d |
| Stock | n/d | n/d | n/d |
| Debtors | £185,327 | £222,119 | n/d |
| Cash | £528,212 | £230,746 | n/d |
| Creditors due within one year | £871,838 | £734,120 | n/d |
| Creditors due after one year | £1,034,894 | £976,677 | n/d |
| Net current assets | (£158,299) | (£281,255) | n/d |
| Net assets | £1,895,919 | £1,540,230 | n/d |
Equity to enterprise bridge: Net assets of £1.9m include c.£0.5m cash and c.£1.0m of long-term creditors, likely HP/finance lease on the fleet, which would be treated as debt-like at completion. A buyer would therefore expect equity value of roughly EV minus c.£0.5m net debt (long-term creditors less surplus cash). The deferred tax provision of £466k relates to accelerated capital allowances on vehicles; this is non-cash but may require normalisation. Working capital is negative (net current liabilities), which is common in asset-heavy transport where HP falls due, but signals limited buffer. No director loans or property holdings are disclosed.
Valuation and workings
Sector multiples: UK coach and bus hire businesses of this scale typically trade at 4.0x to 6.0x EBITDA. Smaller operators with ageing fleets and high capex sit at the low end; those with contract revenue, compliant fleets and succession depth trade higher. High capital intensity (our assumption: >10% capex to revenue) and moderate revenue quality (c.30% recurring) push this business toward the lower half of the range.
Precedent transaction: In 2019, TLC Travel Group acquired Grayway Coaches, a similarly-sized North West operator, reportedly at c.4.5–5.0x EBITDA. Source: Route One Magazine, September 2019 (https://www.route-one.net/news/tlc-acquires-grayway/).
Indicated EV: At £480k EBITDA (est.) and a 4.0x–5.5x range, the enterprise value sits at approximately £1.9m to £2.6m. The lower end reflects high fleet capex requirements and family key-person risk; the upper end assumes a buyer values the brand, contracts and heritage fleet. This range is sensitive to whether the HP creditor is assumed by the buyer or repaid at completion.
What buyers call exceptional
These bars are calibrated for UK SMEs and do not apply to midcap or larger businesses, where the thresholds are very different.
| Metric | Good | Exceptional | This business | Read |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Industry growth | 5%+ CAGR | 10%+ CAGR | 3–8% (est.) | Below |
| Revenue scale | £10m+ | £20m+ | £3.2m (est.) | Below |
| Revenue growth | 8%+ YoY | 15%+ YoY | c.10% (est.) | Good |
| EBITDA margin | 17.5%+ | 22.5%+ | 15% (est.) | Below |
| Gross margin | 50%+ | 75%+ | not disclosed | Unknown |
| Customer concentration | Top 5 <15% | Top 5 <10% | not disclosed | Unknown |
The metric that most limits the multiple today is revenue scale: at c.£3.2m, the business sits below the threshold where larger trade buyers and PE platforms typically engage actively.
Preparing for exit
| When | Action | Why a buyer cares | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0–3 months | Prepare a detailed fleet schedule showing age, Euro standard, mileage, service history and residual value | Acquirers will haircut the fixed-asset figure if they cannot verify vehicle condition | Multiple (↑) |
| 0–3 months | Compile a contract register for school and scheduled routes, with expiry dates and renewal terms | Shows recurring revenue and contract risk profile | Multiple (↑) |
| 3–9 months | Identify and formalise one or two of the directors as operational leads with day-to-day authority | Five-director family structure looks like key-person risk; clear succession lifts buyer confidence | Multiple (↑) |
| 3–9 months | Renegotiate HP terms or accelerate paydown of long-term creditors to reduce debt-like items at completion | Clears the EV-to-equity bridge and simplifies deal structure | EBITDA (↑) |
| 3–9 months | Review pricing on ad hoc private hire, which is typically underpriced in family operators; a 5% uplift flows straight to margin | Direct margin improvement on non-contract revenue | EBITDA (↑) |
| 9–12+ months | Begin fleet renewal toward Euro VI and ULEZ-compliant vehicles, funded via asset finance where possible | Positions the business for urban LEZ restrictions and reduces buyer capex overhang | Multiple (↑) |
| 9–12+ months | Implement monthly management accounts with departmental P&L (schools, private hire, day trips) | Abridged filings mean buyers have no financial visibility; proper MI de-risks due diligence | Multiple (↑) |
The single highest-return action is formalising a contract register and extending key school contracts before sale, because it converts opaque revenue into demonstrable recurring income, directly supporting a higher multiple.
Choosing your sale route
| Route | Fit | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Trade sale to a competitor, customer or supplier | Strong fit | Regional consolidators (e.g. Centrebus, TLC-style platforms) are actively acquiring fleets in the £2–5m revenue band; Sharpes' brand, depot and heritage fleet add strategic value |
| Private equity (buy-and-build) | Possible | At £480k EBITDA the business is at the lower end for platform interest, but could slot into an existing PE-backed roll-up as a bolt-on |
| Sale to an individual operator | Possible | Family legacy and local brand suit an owner-operator buyer; however, capex intensity and five-director structure may deter solo acquirers without industry experience |
| Employee Ownership Trust | Unlikely | High ongoing capex and HP obligations make deferred payment from future profits risky; 49 employees is viable but cash flow is tight |
The strongest route is a trade sale to a regional consolidator or larger coach group. Buyers like Centrebus or PE-backed platforms are actively seeking East Midlands density and would value the school contracts, depot and heritage fleet for marketing. For this owner, a trade sale likely means the highest upfront price, a 6–12 month transition, and eventual absorption of the brand, so it suits a clean exit rather than legacy preservation.
What the process looks like
At your size a sale is usually a targeted process rather than a full auction: a regional or sector corporate finance adviser approaches a shortlist of credible buyers rather than the whole market. Expect around six to nine months from starting properly to money in the bank.
| Phase | What happens | Typical duration |
|---|---|---|
| Preparation | Clean up the numbers, produce three years of consistent management accounts, pull contracts and leases together, agree expectations on price and timing | 1 to 3 months |
| Marketing | A short anonymous teaser goes to a targeted buyer list, interested parties sign an NDA and receive an information memorandum | 1 to 2 months |
| Offers and selection | Indicative non binding offers arrive, you meet the serious buyers, you pick one and sign heads of terms with exclusivity | 1 to 2 months |
| Due diligence | The buyer's accountants and lawyers examine financial, legal, tax and commercial detail. This is the phase that most often moves the price | 2 to 3 months |
| Legals | The share purchase agreement, disclosure letter, warranties and any service agreements are negotiated in parallel with diligence | 1 to 2 months |
| Completion and beyond | Signing, funds flow, then a handover period you have committed to, commonly six to twelve months | Ongoing |
A specialist adviser is worth their fee here mainly through competitive tension and through protecting the price during diligence, not through finding a buyer you could not have found yourself.
What this is built from
- Companies House filings for 05057320.
- The company's public website (sharpesofnottingham.com), read for what the business actually does and who it sells to.
- Your own ratings on growth, stability, margin and capex, plus sector exit multiples for comparable UK businesses.
Next step
Exit your business to 1868 Capital
1868 Capital, led by Alec Dent, is actively looking to buy and run one strong UK business for the long term. If the profile fits, we can move quickly.

Why Alec started 1868 Capital
LinkedIn postAlec wrote this on why he is looking to buy and run one UK business for the long term.
Read on LinkedInWho is Alec?
Alec Dent leads 1868 Capital, which powers this Exit Estimator. He is looking to buy and personally run one high-quality UK business for the long term.
Before this he co-founded Weezy, grew it to hundreds of staff, sold it to Getir and ran global strategy there. You would be selling your business to an operator who has built, scaled and sold a company.
Is 1868 Capital the right fit?
I meet almost any owner thinking about exit, but this is the formal mandate:
- ✓Revenue of £5m to £60m, ideally with a recurring component and a stable track record
- ✓EBITDA of £1m to £10m with margins of 15% or more
- ✓Consistent growth of 10%+ a year over multiple years
- ✓A strong team in place, allowing a smooth leadership transition
- ✓England, Wales or Scotland, ideally near a major transport hub
- ✓Service-based model in a fragmented sector, mission critical to commercial clients
Other ways to sell
If the mandate does not fit, you may still have strong options:
Trade sale
A competitor or customer buys you. Often the highest headline price, but your business is absorbed and your legacy fades.
Private equity
Financial buyers back the team, then look to sell again in 3 to 5 years on fairly rigid market terms.
Employee Ownership Trust
Sell to your employees, usually with tax advantages and maximum continuity, though at a measured pace.